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Abstract
In academic and public debates, external actors have been considered to promote their rules most effec-
tively in third countries in cases of high and asymmetric interdependence. Hence, high interdependence 
of European Neighborhood Countries (ENC) with Russia has been discussed as a major constraint to EU 
rule transfer. The case of migration policies, however, represents an odd one out: high degrees of inter-
dependence of the ENC and Russia are coupled with compliance with EU rules, whereas lower degrees 
of interdependence correlate with shallow and selective compliance. The paper investigates the de facto 
impact of Russia and the EU on the implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in this 
highly interdependent policy field and argues for a change in perspective: adopting a stronger bottom-up 
perspective on power-based approaches of external governance cannot only account for varying compli-
ance records, but also shows how domestic actors can use multiple external opportunity structures to 
promote their own agenda.
The Author
Esther Ademmer is a PhD candidate at the Berlin Graduate School for 
Transnational Studies (BTS) and a research fellow at the Research College 
on the Transformative Power of Europe (KFG). She holds a Master’s degree 
in International Relations from the Free University of Berlin, the Humboldt 
University and the University of Potsdam and a B.A. in European Studies from 
the University of Osnabrück. She studied at the Elliott School of International 
Affairs at the George Washington University in Washington D.C. Her main fields 
of interest are the EU’s external relations, the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
Security Governance and the South Caucasus.
Contact: ademmer@transnationalstudies.eu
4 | KFG Working Paper No. 32 | November 2011 
Content 
1.   Introduction         6
2.   Pieces that Do Not Fit: Interdependence, Russia and 
       ENP-Compliance         7
   2.1  External Governance and the Bleak Prospect of Neighborhood                             
	 		Europeanization	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 7
       2.2		Interdependence,	Regimes,	and	Compliance	Patterns	in	the	CNC	 	 8
3.   The Missing Link: Interdependence is What You Make of it  12
4.   Comparing Compliance Processes in the Southern Caucasus  15
							4.1		From	Emerging	to	Full	Compliance:	Migration	Policies	in	Armenia	 	 16
       4.2		From	Inertia	to	Selective	Compliance:	Migration	Policies	in	Georgia		 22
5.   Conclusion         26
Bibliography          28
You Make Us Do What We Want | 5
Abbreviations 
AENEAS  Programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries in the    
 area of migration and asylum
AP  European Neighborhood Policy Action Plan
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States
CNC  Caucasian Neighborhood Countries
DMR  Department of Migration and Refugees
DRC  Danish Refugee Council
ENC  European Neighborhood Countries
ENP  European Neighborhood Policy
ENPI  European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument
ILO  International Labor Organization 
IO  International (Governmental) Organization
IOM  International Organization for Migration
JLS  Subcommittee on Justice, Liberty and Security
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization
NIS  Newly Independent States
OSCE  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCA  Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
SIGMA  Support for Improvement in Governance and Management
TACIS  Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States
TAIEX  Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument
6 | KFG Working Paper No. 32 | November 2011 
1. Introduction
Ever since the Tampere Council in 1999 and the creation of the borderless Schengen area, migration flows 
from outside the European Union and their regulation have figured prominently on the EU’s security 
agenda. Concerns about illegal immigration, human trafficking and cross-border crime were newly sparked 
after the enlargement round of 2004, leading eventually to the creation of the European Neighborhood 
Policy (ENP). The ENP contains a form of institutionalized cooperation on migration issues with the new 
neighbors documented in bilateral ENP Action Plans (AP). Among others, the Caucasian Neighborhood 
Countries (CNC) agreed to adopt migration policies intended to strengthen the regulation and control of 
migration flows from their territories to the EU. As a reward for the reform process, the EU offered visa-
facilitation and potential visa-liberalization in return. 
Domestically, however, migration flows and their regulation in the Eastern Neighborhood Countries are 
linked, historically and contemporarily, to Russia rather than the EU. This is particularly true for the CNC 
that lived through a tradition of managed migration during Soviet times, enjoy visa-free travel in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), count large numbers of labor migrants in Russia and depend 
on remittance flows from the northern neighbor. 
Following recent research on the EU’s external governance in the Eastern neighborhood and on leverage 
of alternative hegemons (Levitsky/Way 2006), the prospect of compliance with the ENP in the Southern 
Caucasus thus looks bleak. Interdependence with Russia has been discussed as a constraining factor for the 
effectiveness of EU rule transfer (Dimitrova/Dragneva 2009; Lavenex/Schimmelfennig 2009), which only 
added up to the general pessimism about the ‘Europeanization’ of the new neighborhood. It therefore 
comes as a surprise that we do see policy-specific compliance in the CNC (Ademmer/Börzel 2012), even 
in highly interdependent issue areas such as migration. Given this puzzling result, the paper asks whether 
and under which conditions interdependence with Russia indeed impacts EU-rule transfer to its Eastern 
neighborhood. 
Based on two in-depth case studies in Georgia and Armenia, I argue that the impact of interdependence 
with Russia on compliance with EU-rules depends on two conditions: first, on the fit or misfit of an EU rule 
with the preferences of the targeted government and second, on the application of policy conditionality 
by external actors. The paper adopts a stronger bottom-up approach towards the study of rule-transfer 
under conditions of multiple interdependencies and finds that Russia can “hit” both ways. The alternative 
hegemon can function as a promoter of EU rules, as well as an obstacle for compliance depending on what 
best fits the incumbent CNC governments. The argument is developed as follows: the upcoming section 
introduces the puzzling case of compliance with EU migration policies in Georgia and Armenia and relates 
the empirical findings to recent theoretical discussions about external governance and interdependence 
in the European Neighborhood. Section three presents a bottom-up analytical approach that is employed 
for the case studies in section four. The latter traces the process of compliance with distinct ENP migration 
rules in Georgia and Armenia. The last section summarizes the findings of the analysis.
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2. Pieces that Do Not Fit: Interdependence, Russia and ENP-Compliance
The ENP-implementation patterns of the CNC in the area of migration policies go against the overall skepti-
cism that prevails towards ENP rule transfer in the region. Theoretically, the academic literature leads us to 
expect the lack of a membership perspective, power asymmetries disfavoring the EU and high interdepen-
dence with Russia to undermine compliance with EU rules. The following section introduces the puzzle of 
this paper by shortly outlining the major theoretical assumptions and setting them against the empirical 
findings on migration reform in the CNC.
2.1		 External	Governance	and	the	Bleak	Prospect	of	Neighborhood	Europeanization
Theoretically, the prospect of the EU to exert its “transformative power” in its new neighborhood looks 
rather bleak. The ENP, established as a tool to deal with the new neighbors after 2004, was born out of a 
newly felt interdependence between the EU and its neighborhood countries (Lavenex 2004). Thus, most 
students of Europeanization processes have argued that the increasing degree of interdependence with 
the European Neighborhood Countries (ENC) concerning issues such as energy, migration or organized 
crime disfavors the EU’s bargaining power in the ENP implementation process. The latter is considered 
pivotal for a consistent and credible application of EU conditionality, which again is deemed necessary to 
induce domestic change (Schimmelfennig/ Sedelmeier 2004: 674). Coupled with the lack of a membership 
perspective for the neighborhood countries – another cornerstone of successful rule transfer to the Central 
and Eastern European accession countries – skepticism prevails with regard to the effectiveness of EU 
governance in the ENC (Kelley 2006; Lavenex/Schimmelfennig 2009; Schimmelfennig 2009). Additionally, 
the CNC also display high degrees of misfit between their domestic status quo and the EU rules laid down 
in the bilaterally agreed ENP Action Plan.
The literature on external governance emerged to capture “the extension of internal rules and policies 
beyond membership” (Lavenex/Schimmelfennig 2009: 791). Conceptually, this strand of literature stresses 
domestic and institutional factors, such as state capacity, veto-players, rule codification or the EU’s mode of 
governance to explain diverse compliance outcomes. Yet, it also scrutinizes the explanatory power of inter-
dependence between the ENC and other external actors. The latter are captured in the notion of “power-
based” approaches. These approaches assume that in order to comply with EU rules the target state needs 
to be strongly dependent on the EU and, above all, more so than on other governance providers (Lavenex/
Schimmelfennig 2009: 792). In this vein, high interdependence with Russia has been considered a con-
straining factor for the take-over of EU rules (Dimitrova/Dragneva 2009). Russia is expected to hamper the 
overall rapprochement of the CNC towards the Western hemisphere and undermine the effectiveness of 
EU rule transfer (Baev 2004; Browning/Joenniemi 2008; Bugajski 2010; Perovic 2005). These expectations 
resonate with the prevailing public opinion that countries in the Eastern Neighborhood are torn between 
the EU and Russia (Iarmoliuk 2011; Kucera 2011). Given the high interdependence of the CNC and Russia 
in issue areas of migration, energy and foreign and security policy, just to name a few, the processes of ENP 
rule adoption and implementation are likely to be highly limited.
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Yet, in the case of migration policies, the compliance records of two CNC, namely Armenia and Georgia, 
do not meet the theoretical expectation. Despite high institutional, historical, social and economic inter-
dependence with Russia, Armenia displays full or emerging compliance patterns with ENP migration rules. 
Georgia, however, that lacks the institutional interdependence with Russia, only shows patterns of shallow 
or selective compliance. In order to substantiate the puzzle, the following section presents the different 
degrees of interdependence between the two CNC, Russia and the EU and contrasts them with the coun-
tries’ compliance patterns.
2.2		 Interdependence,	Regimes,	and	Compliance	Patterns	in	the	CNC
Interdependence in the area of migration varies significantly between the EU, Russia and the CNC. The EU 
has set up a dense institutional framework to deal with economic and social interdependence. Russia and 
the CNC, however, share high degrees of economic, social and historical interdependences, but different 
institutional ties within and beyond the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
Migratory Interdependence and Regimes with the EU
In the framework of the ENP the EU has set up a dense institutional structure to cope with rising interde-
pendencies after the last enlargement round in 2004. Yet, the ENP framework rests upon the contractual 
relationships established by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) that took effect in 1999. 
The parties to the PCA foresaw close cooperation on migration-related issues via political dialogue and 
the conclusion of bilateral readmission agreements. Furthermore, the PCA created Cooperation Councils 
for governmental and parliamentary cooperation and the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (TACIS) functioned as the main assistance scheme to support reforms in the post-
Soviet countries. The ENP strengthened and concretized the migration policy approach towards the CNC, 
replaced TACIS with the new European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) as a new funding 
scheme and offered closer economic integration and visa facilitation as rewards for major reform steps. 
In 2009, the Eastern Partnership aimed again at deepening the relations. It substantiated the offer of re-
wards once more and suggested deep and comprehensive free trade agreements, potential visa-free travel 
and new Association Agreements to replace the PCAs as incentives for policy reform and implementation 
(Schäffer/Tolksdorf 2009: 1). The proposed policy reforms are laid down in bilateral ENP APs. In the field 
of migration policy, these are, among others, the development of a national migration action plan, the 
enhancement of document security and the signing of readmission agreements by the CNC (European 
Commission 2006a, 2006b).
In order to implement these policies, the EU relies on positive conditionality, assistance and socializa-
tion mirroring in principle the instruments of the EU enlargement process (Kelley 2006). The conditionali-
ties	for granting visa facilitation and visa liberalization have already been formulated prior to the Eastern 
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Partnership initiative. As agreed in the “Common Approach to visa-facilitation” of 2005, the Council of the 
EU links visa facilitation (which precedes visa-free travel) to the signing of an EC-readmission agreement 
(Boniface et al. 2008; Trauner/Kruse 2008:421). In addition, the Council of the European Union declared 
that
“The	EC	should	 take	account	of	 the	 following	 factors	 inter	alia	 in	deciding	whether	 to	open	negotia-
tions	on	visa	facilitation	with	third	countries:	whether	a	readmission	agreement	is	in	place	or	under	ac-
tive	negotiation;	external	relations	objectives;	implementation	record	of	existing	bilateral	agreements	
and	progress	on	related	issues	in	the	area	of	justice,	freedom	and	security	(e.g.	border	management,	
document	security,	migration	and	asylum,	fight	against	terrorism,	(…);	and	security	concerns,	migra-
tory	movements	and	the	impact	of	the	visa	facilitation	agreement.” (Council of the European Union 
2005:3)
The prospect of visa facilitation was further substantiated towards the CNC with the Commission 
Communication on “Strengthening the ENP” in December 2006 and the prospect of Mobility Partnerships 
between the CNC and the EU, which were the result of the extension of the Global Approach on Migration 
to the Eastern Neighborhood (European Commission 2006a, 2007).
The unconditional provision of assistance is provided through the ENPI via thematic, national, regional and 
cross-border programs (European Commission 2006b). It comes in the form of technical assistance (TAIEX, 
Twinning, SIGMA) grants and loans (Neighborhood Investment Facility). The thematic program “migration 
and asylum” (former AENEAS), aims in particular at the reform of migration policies. The third instrument, 
socialization, “comprises all EU efforts to “teach” EU policies – as well as the ideas and norms behind them” 
(Schimmelfennig 2009: 8). This usually happens via political dialogue in the framework of the parliamen-
tary and governmental Cooperation Councils that have been established by the PCA. The subcommittees 
on Justice, Liberty and Security (JLS) deal specifically with migration policies and coordinate the process of 
visa facilitation (European Commission 2010).
Despite the dense institutional ties, historical, social and economic interdependencies are less developed 
between the EU and the CNC. Historically, migration flows from the CNC to EU countries have resulted 
in rather large diasporas of Armenians in France and smaller ones of Georgians in Germany and Greece 
(Manaseryan 2004: 3; Jgamadze/Markarashvili 2009: 9). Yet, the diasporas within the EU do not create simi-
lar social and economic interdependencies as they do within Russia. To begin with, the number of Georgian 
and Armenian migrant workers in the EU is almost 20 times lower than in Russia (Popescu/Wilson 2009: 
34), and remittances vary accordingly. Next to language and cultural borders, this development is above all 
due to the tight control of the EU’s external borders in the Schengen and other EU states (Popescu/Wilson 
2009: 34). The prospect of eased migration to the EU is thus highly attractive, as the facilitation of travel 
of persons is supposed to be followed by the facilitation of trade in goods, i.e. a closer integration into the 
EU single market.
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Migratory Interdependence and Regimes with Russia
The migration regime of Russia and the CNC is moderately institutionalized, but differs profoundly between 
Georgia and Armenia. This is mainly due to Georgia’s opting out of the CIS in 2009. Interdependence with 
Russia in economic and social terms, however, is high in both CNCs.
The founding treaties of the CIS institutionalize cooperation on migration matters among CIS member 
states. Article seven refers to joint activities in the field of migration policies (Sakwa/Webber 1999) and 
the Bishkek Agreement of 1992 established visa-free travel between the CIS member states. However, 
the agreement was followed by diverse bilateral and multilateral agreements that no longer adhered to a 
unified CIS approach (International Centre for Migration Policy Development 2005: 27). The CIS visa-free 
regime applies to Armenia, whereas Russia unilaterally introduced visa requirements for Georgia in 2001 
due to political tensions between the countries. Unlike Russia, Georgia has gradually eased its visa regime 
since 2005 and unilaterally lifted visa-requirements for specific countries including Russia (Van Selm 2005). 
Lately, also the Collective Security Treaty Organization started to work on fighting illegal migration and 
engaged in various operations of security forces within its member states towards this aim (Gorupai 2008; 
Marat/Murzakulova 2007). 
Since the 1990s, the migration of CNC citizens to the northern neighbor has thus flourished given the pre-
vailing societal and linguistic ties stemming from Soviet times (International Labour Organization 2008: 15). 
In addition, multi-ethnic families and relational ties to people residing in Russia stimulate migration flows. 
In a move to fight illegal migration and under conditions of increased “Caucasophobia” due to the pro-
tracted Chechen conflict, Russia tightened its immigration laws and procedures in the early 2000s (Tishkov 
et al. 2005: 23). Instead of halting the immigration process, the measures made illegal migration increase, 
even for migrants from CIS countries, who were still eligible for visa-free travel (Ivakhnyuk 2009: 41). Only 
recently, given its demographic situation, Russia started to increasingly seek immigration again.
Economic interdependence with Russia cannot be overestimated considering the demand for cheap work 
force and the economic effect of migration on the home societies. Remittance flows from the migrants 
to their countries of origin significantly contribute to the CNC’s GDP and function as social stabilizers in 
situations of economic stress (Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2007: 17; Tishkov et al. 2005: 29). The es-
timation of remittance flows and their share of the GDP differ across sources and given the large amounts 
of illegal migration, reliable data are hard to generate. Yet, estimations of the percentage that remittances 
contribute to the GDP of each CNC largely amount to at least 10 percent (Tishkov et al. 2005: 28). Following 
World Bank estimates, remittances from Russia to Georgia amounted to 491 million US dollars in 2010, 
while Armenia received 436 million US dollars, which constituted approximately four to five percent of the 
countries GDPs in 2010  (World Bank 2010). As a result, the contribution of remittance flows, particularly 
from Russia, to both Armenia’s and Georgia’s GDP can be considered substantial (Minasyan et al. 2007: 31; 
The Economist Intelligence Unit 2007: 27).
Yet, interdependence between Georgia and Russia is lower in institutional terms and Georgia has little 
prospect of visa liberalization with Russia. On the other hand, Armenia would still be hit hard by the in-
troduction of a visa regime with its northern ally. Following the argument of power-based explanations, 
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compliance with EU norms would, if at all, be more likely to occur in Georgia than in Armenia. Overall, 
however, Armenia shows a positive compliance pattern with ENP rules, whereas Georgia lags behind and 
has only recently managed to catch up selectively.
Compliance	Patterns	in	Georgia	and	Armenia
Compliance, rule adoption and its application or implementation have so far been used as interchangeable 
terms, even though they refer to different stages of the policy cycle. The distinction between policy adop-
tion and implementation that is made by the external governance literature (Lavenex/Schimmelfennig 
2009: 800f) is helpful to distinguish different degrees of compliance. While policy adoption usually relates 
to output compliance that captures the passage of administrative measures making the application of the 
rule possible (Easton 1957), implementation refers to outcome compliance, comprising the de facto ap-
plication of a rule. In order to define and conceptualize compliance patterns, I will refer to full compliance 
in cases in which both policy adoption and implementation occur. Emerging compliance captures the term 
of full policy adoption and increasing degrees of its application. Shallow compliance defines selective policy 
adoption without implementation, while inertia names the cases where both are missing.
Concerning ENP migration rules, Armenia shows a constant pattern of emerging and full compliance, de-
spite a high degree of interdependence with Russia. Armenia has approved a Concept Paper of migration 
regulation and a national action plan in the framework of an inter-ministerial working group (Grigoryan 
2011; Migration Agency of the RA Ministry of Territorial Administration 2010). Similarly, the country com-
plies with the technical introduction of biometric passports (PanArmenian.net 2011) and has negotiated 
and implemented bilateral readmission agreements with a large number of EU and non-EU countries since 
2003.
Georgia displays patterns of inertia until late 2009 and complies only selectively with the migration-related 
ENP-rules under scrutiny in this paper, even though it lacks high degrees of institutional interdependence 
with Russia. With regard to readmission agreements, Georgia made little efforts to sign a similarly dense 
web of bilateral agreements with EU or Schengen states as Armenia (see Figure 1).
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Figure	1:	Number	of	Readmission	Agreements	with	EU-MS	or	Members	to	the	Schengen	Agreement
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Armenia (2011);  Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011)
In addition, a national action plan has been drafted with the help of the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) in 2008 but has never been passed by the government. The European Commission bluntly 
expressed its dissatisfaction with the Georgian migration policy in its progress report of 2008 criticizing 
the lack of a written policy document and the “extremely liberal nature” of the unwritten migration policy 
(European Commission 2008: 8). The inertia that marked compliance patterns in Georgia has changed 
only recently. Georgia has started to display patterns of selective compliance since late 2009. The overall 
EC readmission agreement was signed in 2010 and took effect in 2011 (Civil Georgia 2011; RAPID 2010) 
and biometric passports have been issued since 2011 (Ministry of Justice of Georgia 2010b). Yet, so far no 
national action plan of migration has been passed.
The correlation of compliance and interdependence with Russia is thus puzzling. The different degrees of 
interdependence with Russia cannot fully account for the compliance patterns in the case of migration 
policies. In order to shed more light on the conditions under which interdependence with Russia matters, 
the following section introduces a bottom-up perspective on the study of EU rule transfer on conditions of 
multiple interdependencies that is subsequently applied to the cases of Armenia and Georgia.
3. The Missing Link: Interdependence is What You Make of It
It is the nature of interdependence and power-based approaches not to open the black box of the state 
and “go domestic”. Yet, in the case of ENP rule transfer under conditions of more than one external actor 
involved, interdependence and power are likely to be significantly filtered through domestic perceptions 
and preferences of domestic governments. The following section thus suggests the introduction of two ad-
ditional factors into the analysis of rule transfer processes under conditions of multiple interdependencies: 
the preferential fit of the agenda of domestic governments with the ENP and policy conditionality provided 
by external actors. 
You Make Us Do What We Want | 13
The literature on Europeanization and domestic structure approaches of external governance have strongly 
pointed to institutional path dependencies and misfit as determinants of the Europeanization process 
(Knill/Lehmkuhl 2000: 24; Lavenex/Schimmelfennig 2009: 805). In member and accession states, a policy, 
polity or politics misfit has been identified to create windows of opportunity for veto players and norm 
entrepreneurs, which may then potentially lobby for change and Europeanization (Risse/Börzel 2000). In 
the case of the CNC, though, the governments are usually equipped with far-reaching powers, civil society 
is weak and veto points are rare. The misfit argument is therefore mainly used to express skepticism about 
the effectiveness of EU democracy promotion, because autocratic leaders are expected not to cut their 
own powers (Schimmelfennig 2009: 16f). Yet, with regard to soft security policies, such as migration rules, 
the governments are not necessarily status-quo oriented and cost-averse. They might also hold positive 
preferences for EU policies that strengthen their governmental capacities or support the implementation 
of previously held agendas. Positive preferences of governments towards EU rules are captured by the 
notion of preferential fit (Ademmer/Börzel 2012). It is defined as a fit of preferences over outcomes, which 
are, unlike preferences over strategies, exogenous to the state’s interaction with external actors in the 
first place (Frieden 1999). These preferences can be deduced from the intrinsic motivation of an incum-
bent government to stay in power and to implement salient issues of its domestic agenda to please its 
constituencies.
In this vein, the EU is likely to have an impact in the CNC, regardless of the status quo, if the EU policy 
supports the political agenda of the domestic (potentially autocratic) government and provides it with 
benefits, legitimacy or capacity. The same is true for Russia: If Russia’s foreign policy provides additional or 
alternative capacities for the realization of an incumbent’s preference, the targeted state is likely to make 
use of it. This process of “usage” has been identified as crucial to patterns of Europeanization in Member 
States as well as in the Central European Accession Countries (Brusis 2005; Jacquot/Woll 2003; Mendez 
et al. 2006; Woll/Jacquot 2010). Neighborhood countries that are targeted by multiple external actors are 
even more likely not only to give in to externally promoted pressure but to refer to an opportunistic “à la 
carte approach” (Popescu/ Wilson 2009) picking and choosing externally promoted rules to cater for their 
domestic constituencies. 
Yet, notions of asymmetrical interdependence have been identified in the external policy of the EU (Lavenex 
2008), as the EU links conditions to the ‘carrots’ of market access, visa facilitation or liberalization (Trauner/
Kruse 2008b). Russia has also frequently been named and blamed for pressuring countries in its ‘Near 
Abroad’ by blackmailing them to comply with the Russian foreign policy agenda (Hedenskog/Larsson 2007; 
Perovic 2005). While we can expect an actor to pick and choose external policies which come with uncon-
ditional opportunity structures, such as assistance, this might not be the case for externally promoted rules, 
which the external actor links to other salient incentives or issue areas. 
For unconditional opportunity structures, full compliance with an EU policy is expected in cases of pref-
erential fit with an EU rule, as actors are likely to use EU assistance and neglect Russia’s assistance, if the 
latter does not support the EU policy that fits the incumbent (rivaling assistance). Emerging instead of 
full compliance might still occur if the capacity building provided by a single actor does not suffice to pay 
off implementation costs. Incumbent governments are likely to profit from both the EU’s and Russia’s 
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assistance if they help to implement its previously held agenda (concerted assistance). Inertia, however, is 
expected in cases of preferential misfit, as the domestic actors are free to neglect the external opportunity 
structure which does not correspond to their agenda. The hypotheses are summed up in Table 1.
Table	1:	Assistance	and	Expected	Compliance	Patterns
Assistance Concerted Assistance Rivaling Assistance
Fit with EU-rule Full Compliance Full/Emerging Compliance
Misfit with EU-rule Inertia Inertia
            
If policy transfer is linked to policy conditionality, in form of the provision (positive conditionality) or the 
neglect (negative conditionality) of salient opportunity structures, it is still likely that we see policy transfer 
that is at odds with the preferences of the domestic government. Policy conditionality does not necessarily 
change the underlying preference of a government over outcomes, but rather changes its strategies to-
wards achieving this goal (Frieden 1999). We may thus see a change in the CNC agenda, while the de facto 
application of a rule does not occur (shallow compliance). However, in cases in which both external actors 
apply policy conditionality, this conditionality might either double in cases were both countries promote 
the same rule (concerted policy conditionality) or provide alternatives to a target state to elude from the 
requirements of an external actor (rivaling policy conditionality). Under conditions of multiple interdepen-
dence actors are likely to pick and choose the conditionality that best fits their domestic needs. While they 
can hardly elude from concerted conditionality, they are likely to do so in cases of rivaling conditionality, 
complying with the rules that correlate best with their domestic agenda, which is what Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier (2004) coin “cross-conditionality” (see Table 2). As rivaling conditionality might also render 
the initial implementation of EU rules more expensive, emerging compliance instead of full compliance can 
be expected.
Table	2:	Conditionality	and	Expected	Compliance	Patterns
Conditionality Concerted Conditionality Rivaling Conditionality
Fit with EU-rule Full Compliance Full/Emerging Compliance
Misfit with Eu-rule Shallow/Selective Compliance Inertia
 
Cross-socialization and cross-conditionality processes, which have already been discussed in the literature 
(Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2004: 674) are thus not necessarily the result of an asymmetric structural 
interdependence to a non-EU external actor. Without neglecting the validity of the overall argument that 
rivaling opportunity structures offered by non-EU actors might constrain EU rule transfer, it faces two em-
pirical and analytical problems in the European Neighborhood. First, these approaches rely on norm diver-
gence, which is hard to establish for actors other than the EU or the US that do not have a clear, publicly 
available script of specific norm promotion as it is codified in the ENP Action Plans. Second, the approach 
considers cross-conditionality to take effect, once the benefits promoted by a non-EU third actor exceed 
the ones provided by the EU. The evaluation of incentives for domestic actors, however, strongly depends 
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on their domestic constituencies and political agendas that maintain the incumbent’s power base. They 
can thus not be derived of comparing incentive structures only. Even under conditions of EU-Russian norm 
divergence and the provision of alternative incentive structures, the CNC might still choose EU rule adop-
tion, if the EU-promoted rule is an issue of salience for the incumbent regime and can be used for its own 
domestic purposes. Hence, the argument put forward here does not promote an entirely new approach, 
but rather a change in perspectives towards a stronger analytical focus on domestic power constellations 
for determining the explanatory value of power-based approaches to external governance.
In the approach developed here, the impact of interdependence with Russia on EU-policy transfer is thus 
likely to be filtered by two layers: the preferential fit of the governmental agenda, which might lead to 
instances of usage in the rule adoption or implementation process and the application of policy condition-
ality by external actors. The extent to which the two factors can account for policy variation in the case of 
Georgia and Armenia is analyzed in the next section.
4. Comparing Compliance Processes in the Southern Caucasus 
The case of migration policy reform in the South Caucasian countries of Georgia and Armenia is selected 
for comparison due to the countries’ overall geographic and historical characteristics and their interdepen-
dence with Russia and the EU in migration issues. In addition, they are comparable with regard to the policy 
misfit in the policies under scrutiny in this paper. Both Georgia and Armenia lacked national action plans 
on migration and asylum and biometric passports prior to the initiation of the ENP (European Commission 
2005a, 2005b). They also fell short of bilateral or EC wide readmission regimes, which were demanded in 
the PCAs and ENP Action Plans (European Union 1999a). In addition, both countries are ranked as partly 
free by the Freedom House Index in 2006 with executives that enjoy far-reaching powers and an oppo-
sition which fails to provide for political alternatives (Freedom House 2006a; 2006b). They also display 
comparable levels of state capacity (Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2006)1 and are subject to the same 
modes of governance employed by the EU in the framework of the ENP. In addition, the legalization and 
codification of the promoted EU rules in the ENP Action Plan is comparable, given that the policies chosen 
resemble one another in the Action Plans of Georgia and Armenia (European Commission 2006c, 2006d). 
Yet, both countries’ elites have different governmental preferences that shape their domestic and foreign 
policy behavior and hold different relationships to Russia, which is likely to lead to differences in the provi-
sion of incentive structures.
Starting from the puzzling compliance output, the empirical analysis tries to trace back the processes that 
lead to positive compliance patterns in the case of migration policy in Armenia. It sheds light on the ob-
stacles that caused inertia in the Georgian context prior to 2009 and which made the country display selec-
tive compliance patterns afterwards. The comparison focuses on the preferential fit of the two CNC and 
their interplay with the incentives structures stemming from both the EU and Russia. Policy conditionality 
1 Armenia scores comparatively better in the stateness index, which is however due to Georgia’s lack of monopoly 
of force in the de facto republics. This still allows for a comparison of the countries with regard to the state 
capacity of the central government to pass reforms for the territories they control. 
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is defined as the conditional offer of policy-specific, non-membership incentives in return for reform initia-
tives and shall be measured in actions and speech acts by external actors. Preferential (mis)fit is measured 
in the convergence of preferences over outcomes of the EU and domestic actors according to whether the 
application of the EU-promoted rule supports (fit) or undermines (misfit) the incumbent’s power base, 
which is presented prior to each analysis. The empirical analysis builds on secondary literature, reports of 
governments, international organizations (IO) and non-governmental organizations (NGO), media outlets 
and approximately 40 interviews that were conducted during research trips in Armenia and Georgia.
4.1	 From	Emerging	to	Full	Compliance:	Migration	Policies	in	Armenia
In Armenia, migration policies have gained particular salience since the end of the 1990s under the then 
President Robert Kocharian and his nationalist coalition. Being considered a “curse” for the country, the 
halting of emigration has mobilized the government and the opposition alike. At the same time, outward 
migration and remittance inflows stabilize the domestic political situation, by securing a base of income 
for an impoverished larger part of the population that does not profit from the double-digit growth of 
Armenia’s economy. Against this backdrop, passive and active opportunity structures stemming from both 
the EU and Russia provided Armenia with additional resources for the implementation of policies which 
helped both to satisfy a rather nationalist agenda on migration regulation, while at the same time easing 
the economic and political stress through facilitated legal migration.
Government	Preferences	in	Armenia
Both the first President of independent Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian, as well as his successors gained 
and lost their legitimacy over notions of Armenian nationalism relating to the conflict with Azerbaijan over 
Nagorno-Karabakh - the Armenian enclave within Azerbaijan’s international borders - and the conflict with 
Turkey over the recognition of the Armenian genocide of 1915. While Ter-Petrossian had led the ‘Karabakh 
movement’ as a national revolution against the Soviet regime, he was ousted over his pragmatic rap-
prochement to Turkey and Azerbaijan. Robert Kocharian successfully challenged Ter-Petrossian enjoying 
the support of large parts of the Armenian diaspora and nationalist Armenian parties that rallied behind 
a more traditionalist national program (Hofmann 2009; Mayer 2007). 
Kocharian, as well as his preferred successor Serge Sargsyan, who took office in 2008, have mostly relied 
on the political support of the Republican Party, the nationalist party Armenian Revolutionary Federation-
Dashnaktsutyun (ARF-D) and veteran diaspora-based organizations such as the Ramkavar-Azatakan and 
Orinats Erkir (Freire/Simao 2007). In addition, Kocharian’s and Sargsyan’s power increasingly rested on the 
cooptation of oligarchic economic elites that also resumed parliamentary power via the newly founded 
party “Prosperous Armenia” after elections in 2007 (Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2010). In return for 
securing their preferential access to certain segments of the economy, the Armenian oligarchs sidelined 
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with the president, financed the presidential election campaigns and reportedly helped to oust regime 
opponents (Danielyan 2006).
Both the Kocharian and the Sargsyan administrations declared migration an issue of particular salience, 
which reflected historical nationalist traditions as well as a generally negative perception of out-migration. 
Halting emigration and returning the Armenian diaspora to its native country strongly corresponded to 
the Armenian tradition of	hay	dat	and	Araratism2, which the nationalist opposition had endorsed to oust 
Ter-Petrossian (Hofmann 2009). The negative perception of emigration from Armenia was shared by the 
larger population, most likely due to the historical experience of massive flight and forced expulsions in 
the course of the century-long struggle over the Armenian Highland (Savvidis 2011, 218). In 1999, the 
Kocharian government established the Department of Migration and Refugees (DMR) due to the emigra-
tion situation in the late 1990s caused by large numbers of refugees stemming from the war with Azerbaijan 
and the devastating earthquake (UNDP 2001). From 1990 to 2000, around 900,000 Armenians emigrated 
from Armenia, which constitutes around one third of the current Armenian population (Poghosyan 2011: 
42).  Migration was subsequently framed as an issue of primary importance to the country, which was 
reflected in governmental programs and debates in major election races (Government of Armenia 2000; 
Kocharian 2003). Emigration also remained an issue of salience under the new president Serge Sargsyan, 
whose Republican Party had made the “return Armenians from all over the world to their Native country” 
(Republican Party of Armenia 2011) a major goal. Migration was declared a “major concern of the govern-
ment” in 2008 and a “demographic threat […] to national security” (Government of Armenia 2007, 2008b). 
Migration was also intrinsically linked to the conflict with Azerbaijan, which the latter hoped to solve by 
Armenia’s demographic decline.
The	Diverse	Use	of	External	Opportunity	Structures	–	Complying	with	the	ENP
The Armenian government used both the EU’s and to a lesser extent Russia’s assistance to implement 
and justify their own policies directed at halting and regulating migration flows from Armenia, as well as 
facilitating the legal mobility for persons to ease socio-political stress and hence the potential for political 
turmoil.
First, the Migration Service together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs promoted the conclusion of bi-
lateral readmission agreements. Bilateral readmission agreements formalized the return of Armenian and 
third country nationals that were illegally residing abroad and had entered their country of destination via 
Armenia. Armenia intensively engaged in the formalization of bilateral readmission with the EU and other 
partners even before the prospect of visa facilitation was explicitly granted with the Strengthening	of	the	
ENP in 2007 (Boniface et al. 2008: 4). Currently, Armenia has signed 12 bilateral readmission agreements 
with EU member states and Schengen associates, which puts it in top of all CIS countries and Georgia.3
2 “As with Zionism, it [Araratism] emanates from the necessity of bringing home the worldwide diaspora, which 
requires reconquering and uniting all areas of settlement, both current and historical” (Hofmann 2009).
3 Armenia has signed readmission agreements with Latvia (2002), Lithuania (2003), Denmark (2003), Switzerland 
(2005), Germany (2006), Bulgaria (2007), Sweden (2008), Belgium (2009), Netherlands (2009), Luxembourg 
(2009), Czech Republic (2010) and Norway (2010)(Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011; Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Armenia 2011).
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The conclusion of bilateral readmission agreements was compatible with the broader policy of returning 
ethnic Armenians to their home country, which corresponded to the nationalist agenda of the dominant 
Republican Party (Republican Party of Armenia 2011) as well as the ARF-D and it picked up the principle 
of the “national program” to return ethnic migrants to their home country (Hofmann 2009). As readmis-
sion agreements were usually linked to reintegration assistance from the countries of destination, the 
Migration Agency of the Republic of Armenia (former DMR) considered the conclusion of readmission 
agreements a major opportunity for financing reintegration programs, while at the same time showing 
its readiness to European partners to also cooperate on sensitive issues.4 Internally, the Migration Agency 
promoted the conclusion of readmission agreements in 2003 as the institutionalization of the right to 
return for Armenian citizens, a right stipulated in the Armenian constitution.5 Reintegration assistance 
was considered a major asset by the government authorities and deputies of the ruling coalition in the 
Armenian National Assembly to “solve reintegration issues”6 and implement policies of information of 
potential migrants, prevention of second migration, and reintegration measures.7
In order to implement readmission agreements and the reintegration of returned Armenians, the Armenian 
government actively used the financial and technical assistance of both the EU and Russia. The Ministry of 
Diaspora asked for a TAIEX project in 2010 to set up a law on repatriation in line with the EU migration ac-
quis (European Commission 2011a). The implementation of readmission agreements was also supported 
by the EU’s thematic program on migration and asylum in 2009 with an EC contribution of approximately 
700,000 Euros (Armenian UN Association 2009). Apart from the EU, the Armenian authorities also resorted 
to the help of Russia to readmit and reintegrate returned Armenians. Armenia and Russia signed a bilateral 
readmission agreement and an executive protocol on its implementation in 2010 (President of the Republic 
of Armenia 2010). The Police of the Republic of Armenia implemented an awareness-raising campaign in 
2005 and 2006 that was jointly developed with the embassy of the Russian Federation in Armenia and 
the Russian Federal Service for Migration. It aimed at informing Armenian citizens about the migration 
situation in Russia (Zanfrini et al. 2008: 28f), to supposedly diminish migration flows from Armenia and 
fight illegal migration. A clear EU policy conditionality linked to visa facilitation, which was only brought 
up in late 2006, was thus not needed to make the Armenian government comply with the request to sign 
readmission agreements, as this policy fitted their own domestic preference.
The same developments are noticeable with regard to the introduction of biometric passports in Armenia, 
which mainly served an agency closely affiliated to the president, the Armenian Police, to implement a 
policy preference that it has held since 2004. The capacity building provided by the EU and other external 
donors equipped the police with the possibility to realize its pre-existing agenda. The visa and passport 
department of the Armenian police easily absorbed the request of the EU to implement the biometric 
4 Interview with an official of the State Migration Service of the  Republic of Armenia (RA) in Yerevan, Armenia, 
October 2010. 
5 Interview with a representative of the State Migration Service of RA in Yerevan, Armenia, October 2010.
6 Interview with a Member of the National Assembly of RA (‘Prosperous Armenia’) in Yerevan, Armenia, October 
2010.
7 Interview with an official of the State Migration Service of RA in Yerevan, Armenia, October 2010; Interview with 
a Member of the National Assembly of RA (‘Prosperous Armenia’) in Yerevan, October 2010.
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passport and is to start issuing them in early 2012, following a presidential decree of 2008 (Government of 
the Republic of Armenia: 2008).8 The reform corresponded to ongoing policy developments in the country, 
given that Armenia had already started to work on the enhancement of document security in 2006.9 The 
progress report of the EC acknowledges that Armenia managed to introduce improved security standards 
in its passports in 2007 (European Commission 2008a: 12), and a civil servant of the European Commission 
underlined that those documents would have already sufficed to allow for visa facilitation, though not visa 
liberalization with the EU.10 The idea to introduce biometric identifiers, however, was brought to Armenia 
in 2004 via a civil servant of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who participated in an OSCE conference, where 
he learned about the advantages and disadvantages of biometric identifiers.11 He successfully lobbied the 
passport and visa department of the Armenian police for their introduction12 that consequently applied 
for a TAIEX project to exchange views with European Member States on their experience with biometric 
identifiers in 2007 (PAO Armenia 2007). The large part of capacity-building measures to implement the 
project was still stemming from a joint project of the IOM and the OSCE including training, consultation 
and policy advice (International Organization for Migration 2010). Capacity building in the form of financial 
support to pay for equipment supply was not granted to Armenia, unlike in Georgia. The delay of passport 
introduction from 2011 to early 2012 was thus primarily linked to a lack of capacity within the Armenian 
police and lengthy negotiation processes about the terms and conditions of supplying the equipment with 
the relevant companies (News.am 2011).
The overall implementation of ENP requirements was also significantly facilitated by the strong conver-
gence between the agenda of the State Migration Service and the ENP Action Plan. With regard to the 
establishment of a national action plan on migration, the State Migration Service actively sought the sup-
port of the EU and soon became the main beneficiary institution for EU capacity-building measures in the 
field. It applied for TAIEX projects to create a national action plan for migration in 2008 and 2010 (European 
Commission 2011a; , 2011b), and recently applied for Twinning assistance that, among other issues, in-
tends to further assist the implementation of the national action plan (European Commission 2011b).13 
Behind the scenes, however, there was a major conflict erupting between the police and the Migration 
Agency about the coordinating function on migration issues.14 The police, with close ties to the presidential 
apparatus and its security-related agenda, was significantly strengthened after the clashes of Armenian se-
curity forces and protestors after the presidential elections in 2008. A presidential decree was passed that 
concentrated every migration-related activity within the police, rendering migration an issue of criminal 
8 Interview with an official of the Ministry of Economy of the RA in Yerevan, Armenia, October 2010.
9 Interview with an official of the Passport and Visa department of the Police of RA in Yerevan, Armenia, October 
2010.
10 Interview with an official of the European Commission, DG Home Affairs, Brussels, August 2011.
11 Interview with an official of the Consular Department/ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of RA in Yerevan, Armenia, 
October 2010.
12 Interview with an official of Consular Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of RA in Yerevan, Armenia, 
October 2010.
13 Interview with an official of the State Migration Service of RA in Yerevan, Armenia, 10/2010.
14 Interview with an official of the Consular Department/ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of RA in Yerevan, Armenia, 
10/2010.
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concern, rather than a matter to be dealt with by a purely civilian authority.15 Thus, while the Migration 
Agency actively sought the support of the EU, it was unable to channel this into policy output. It was only 
after some governmental reshuffling and criticism of external donors, such as the UN Refugee Agency 
UNHCR, that the Armenian migration institution was again upgraded to hold the status of a State Migration 
Service (Hovhannisian 2011: 10).16 As a result of the work of the State Migration Service, a concept paper 
on migration was passed in 2010 and a National Action Plan was prepared in the framework of a working 
group that comprises the most relevant governmental actors in the field of migration (Migration Agency of 
the RA Ministry of Territorial Administration 2010). The efforts that the government had made towards the 
strategic planning of migration policies also served the authorities to subvert migration-related criticism 
by the opposition. When migration flows peaked in the beginning of 2011 and the opposition alleged the 
state not to tackle the problem of migration, the authorities frequently referred to the National Action Plan 
on migration to prove the opposite (Armenian News 2011; PanArmenian.net 2011b).
Despite the highly nationalist agenda and the emphasis of governmental and presidential programs to halt 
migration, Armenia was hoping to quickly start negotiations on visa facilitation with the EU (Epress.am 
2010a). While the EU still fell short of providing the necessary negotiation mandate to the Commission, 
Russia was already facilitating immigration for Armenians, beyond the visa-free travel that prevailed in 
the CIS. In 2009, Russia’s ‘Compatriots program’ provided legal work opportunities for Armenians wish-
ing to migrate to Russia. The ‘Compatriots program’ figured prominently on the agenda of the opposi-
tion forces in Armenia, condemning them as proofs that the State was indeed promoting migration from 
Armenia (Armtown 2011; Epress.am 2010b, 2011a, 2011b). Following the fierce criticism of the opposition 
in 2011, the government declared that it shared the concern and agreed to discuss the issue with the 
Russian authorities (Mediamax 2011). The reluctance to do so prior to 2011, as well as other statements 
by governmental officials and economic indicators, however, suggest that the program also benefitted the 
Armenian authorities in times of socio-economic strain within the country. This can be understood against 
the fact that the double-digit growth that Armenia’s authorities had relied on, vanished in the course of 
the financial crisis. As the following data indicates, Armenia was hit significantly worse by the economic 
downturn in 2009 than Georgia (see Figure 2). 
15 Interview with an official of the State Migration Service of RA in Yerevan, Armenia, October 2010.
16 Interview with an official of the State Migration Service of RA in Yerevan, Armenia, October 2010.
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Figure 2: Real GDP Growth Rates
Likewise, remittances payments significantly decreased in 2009 (World Bank 2011), as the global economic 
crisis also reduced work opportunities for Armenians abroad. While high growth rates had particularly 
served the small and wealthy elite in Armenia and thus secured the incumbents power structure, around 
70 percent of the Armenian population had relied on remittances to escape poverty prior to the finan-
cial crisis (Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2008; International Labour Organization 2008; Tishkov et al. 
2005). The decrease in remittance payments in 2009 hence affected the economic and social situation of 
the country. The ‘Compatriots program’, for which Armenians increasingly applied as a means to escape 
poverty after 2009, was considered to ease the economic and social stress for the Armenian authorities 
(Grigoryan 2011). Statements of government officials also suggest that it helped to alleviate the political 
tensions for the incumbent elite. Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan publicly rejected criticism that the govern-
ment failed to stop migration, asking: “What can we do, we should do everything so these people won’t 
flee, so that critical mass remains here and a revolution happens?” (Epress.am 2011b).
To sum up, assistance provided by the EU and Russia for readmitting and raising the awareness of migrants 
helped the Armenians to implement their agenda of sustainably returning ethnic Armenians, while the 
work on the National Action Plan on migration helped to subvert criticism from the opposition about the 
encouragement of migration. At the same time, the response of the Armenian authorities to the Russian 
‘Compatriots Program’ suggests that it served the incumbents to alleviate the economic and political stress 
in the light of rising levels of poverty, particularly after the financial crisis. Thus, interdependence with 
Russia did not constrain EU rule transfer, because the agenda of the Armenian government displayed an 
overall fit with the ENP prescription and Russia provided for additional assistance for its implementation.
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4.2	 From	Inertia	to	Selective	Compliance:	Migration	Policies	in	Georgia	
Until 2008, the government under President Mikheil Saakashvili showed little interest in reforming mi-
gration-related policies in Georgia. In line with its overall neoliberal agenda, the Singaporean model of 
the maximal deregulation of the state constrained the regulation of migration flows, as it was promoted 
by the Armenian authorities. As opposed to halting migration, mobility was put upfront of the Georgian 
agenda in order to keep a steady inflow of remittance payments and boost the tourism sector. Compliance 
processes with ENP migration policies only started after August 2008, when the EU clearly linked policy 
conditionality to its offer of visa facilitation agreements, which was reinforced by an indirect additional 
conditionality of Russia.
Government preferences in Georgia
The Rose Revolution in 2003 brought to power a group of young reformers led by former Justice Minister 
Mikheil Saakashvili and Parliament speaker Nino Burjanadze that had peacefully ousted the former President 
Eduard Shevardnadze, whom they accused of widespread corruption. In 2004, Mikheil Saakashvili, the 
young western-educated politician was sworn in as President, pledging to clean the country of corruption, 
reinstall its territorial integrity and integrate the country into Euro-Atlantic structures (Companjen 2010: 
24). Saakashvili’s United National Movement acquired a stronghold in Parliament and mainly co-opted 
large parts of the civil society in the newly formed administration, leaving the country without a power-
ful opposition. In addition, Saakashvili successfully introduced amendments to the Georgian constitution 
into Parliament to further extend the presidential powers. What followed was a quick reintegration of the 
formerly separatist region of Adjaria and a successful crackdown of petty corruption, while South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia remained de facto independent republics in the international borders of Georgia and elite 
corruption remained widespread. With the arrival of Kakha Bendukidze, an ethnic Georgian and Russian 
oligarch, a neo-liberal reform consensus was established within the Saakashvili administration from 2004 
onwards. The deregulation of the state with the overall aim to reach a double digit economic growth, 
dovetailed Saakashvili’s radical anti-corruption agenda and was praised as the only way to consolidate 
the impoverished Georgian state (European Stability Initiative 2010a: 9). As early as 2006, Bendukidze’s 
reforms rewarded Georgia with the label “best reformer” in the Doing Business Index of the World Bank 
(World Bank 2006). In the meantime the relationship to Russia had worsened considerably after several 
conflicts over gas deliveries in the winter of 2005 and 2006, trade embargos for certain Georgian products 
and the “spy crisis” (Hedenskog/Larsson 2007). As a result, Bendukidze’s privatization agenda was under 
attack of the marginalized Georgian opposition, claiming that he was selling strategic assets of the Georgian 
economy to Russia (Papava 2006). After increased internal criticism of Saakashvili’s reforms in 2008, early 
presidential elections in January and the war with Russia in August that year, Bendukidze was ousted. 
Under the newly formed government under Mikheil Saakashvili and his United National Movement poli-
cies related to migration management were not an issue of particular salience. This was first of all due to 
a massive inflow of Georgians shortly after Saakashvili’s successful revolution and a comparatively better 
migration balance than in Armenia. Yet, Georgia had lost approximately 20 percent of its population from 
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the 1990s to 2002 (Badurashvili 2011: 79), relapsed into an increasing outflow in 2006 and figured, just 
like Armenia, mostly as an emigration country (National Statistics Office of Georgia 2011; State Migration 
Service 2011). 
Migration was still not of particular concern to the Georgian government. It was not raised in Saakashvili’s 
presidential election campaign, in his inaugurational speech of 2004 or in the party program of his United 
National Movement (United National Movement 2011). His government rather focussed on internal migra-
tion issues intrinsically linked to the secessionist conflicts in Georgia. Border demarcation and the internal 
displacement of ethnic Georgians from the de facto republics were included into the governmental agenda 
(Government of Georgia 2005; Van Selm 2005), corresponding to historical notions of Georgian national-
ism that was far more linked to territorial integrity and independence than to diaspora cooperation or re-
turn (Reisner 2009). Likewise, and presumably due to more positive experiences of migratory movements 
in the past, emigration was not considered a “curse” as it was the case in Armenia (Savvidis 2011).
Instead of halting emigration, the Georgian authorities were committed to the freedom of movement, to 
“promote Georgian labor migration” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Georgia 2006: 16) and 
“increase labor mobility” (Government of Georgia 2005). The liberalization and simplification of movement 
for Georgian citizens was salient on the foreign policy agenda of the government (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Georgia 2006), particularly in terms of its contribution to economic development. 
In 2004 the Law	on	Temporary	Entry,	Stay	and	Exit	of	Foreigners was amended to provide for a liberal visa 
regime with the aim to attract and facilitate the inflow of investors and tourists (World Bank 2005: 24). 
Investment attraction also guided the relationships with Georgians abroad and the Foreign Policy Strategy 
of 2006 stressed the need to exploit the Diaspora’s potential for investment attraction (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Georgia 2006). The deregulatory agenda on migration issues was further demon-
strated by presidential statements of 2010, when Saaksahvili promoted to follow Singapore as a model and 
create an “economy that will create migration” (Saakashvili 2010).
In a nutshell, “migration issues [were] far from being a top priority for a country with a wide range of 
territorial, political, and economic problems” (Van Selm 2005). Yet, the Singapore model, which signifi-
cantly shaped the overall reform context in Georgia after the Rose Revolution, also left its traces on the 
governmental stance towards migration issues. The Saakashvili government, apart from promoting territo-
rial integrity and the integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, also promoted deregulated migration and 
enhanced mobility as a means to foster economic development.
Policy-Conditionality	and	Russia	as	a	Promoter	for	Euro-Atlantic	Integration
Inertia has prevailed with regard to rule adoption and implementation of ENP migration demands until 
recently. The change of compliance patterns goes back to developments in late 2008 when Georgia was 
confronted with concerted policy conditionality that indirectly stemmed from both the EU and Russia: 
while the EU clearly linked its policy conditionality to visa facilitation, demanding Georgia to implement 
readmission agreements and document security, the latter needed to profit from visa facilitation in order 
to thwart negative consequences invoked by Russia.
24 | KFG Working Paper No. 32 | November 2011 
Until late 2009, little progress was made on complying with ENP migration policies in Georgia. Prior to the 
overall EC readmission agreement that Georgia signed in November 2009 few bilateral readmission agree-
ments with individual member states were signed. Five agreements were put in place with Switzerland, 
Ukraine, Bulgaria, Italy and Germany (International Organization for Migration 2008: 12), while the agree-
ment with Italy was never implemented (Government of Georgia 2009). In addition, Georgia did not adopt 
a national action plan on migration and asylum. The Ministry in charge of the coordination of migration 
policies, the Ministry for Refugees and Accommodation in 2008, initially worked on a draft action plan, 
which was also commented on by IOM. However, this draft was not considered by the government and 
ended on the ministerial shelves.17 Following statements of IOs and governmental experts, drafting policies 
in the sphere of migration was not considered to be urgent, lacked powerful advocates in the government 
and was thus not put on the governmental agenda.18 Stakeholders also attributed the lack of policy drafting 
in the sphere of migration to the overall disbelief in regulation prevailing within the Georgian government 
and society (Civil Georgia 2010; European Stability Initiative 2010b). Other civil society representatives also 
stressed that there were simply more urgent issues to be tackled in Georgia, rendering the EU focus on 
migration regulation illegitimate.19 The Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation remained rather inactive 
within the Georgian government and sought only little EU support. It applied for one TAIEX project on labor 
migration (European Commission 2011b), which a representative of the IOM in Georgia bluntly called “a 
waste of money”.20 Concerning the enhancement of document security, Georgia again made little progress 
until 2008. While Armenia had already updated its travel documents’ security and complied with respec-
tive international standards, Georgia failed to do so before 2008. In a nutshell, inertia prevailed with regard 
to migration policy reform, going back mainly to a lack of interest from the Georgian side and the hands-off 
approach of the Georgian government with regard to mobility issues.
Yet, Georgia had continuously stressed the need to profit from early visa facilitation with the EU, an is-
sue that was in line with the overall agenda of mobility promotion and Euro-Atlantic integration of the 
government. Another factor that significantly shaped the Georgian demand for visa facilitation originated 
from the fact that the EU and Russia had already enforced a bilateral visa facilitation agreement in 2007. 
As Russia distributed its passports to the population in the Georgian break-away territories, the Georgian 
authorities considered the EU-Russian agreement to be an indirect encouragement of separatism as they 
facilitated travel to the EU for persons accepting Russian passportization (Goble 2008). Hence, the negative 
incentives stemming from Russia functioned as an additional source of policy conditionality. Visa facilita-
tion was needed in order to thwart the potential negative effect on the governmental priority to reinstall 
17 Interview conducted with an EU official at the European Delegation to Georgia in Tbilisi, Georgia, October 2010; 
Interview conducted with a representative of the Georgian branch of the International Organization for Migration 
in Tbilisi, Georgia, October 2010.
18 Interview conducted with a representative of the Georgian branch of the International Organization for Migration 
in Tbilisi, Georgia, 10/2010; Interview conducted with a civil servant at the Office of the State Minister of Euro-
Atlantic Integration of the Republic of Georgia in Tbilisi, Georgia, October 2010.
19 As an example, one interviewee stated that “not everything that the European Union tells us has to be imple-
mented in the same way. (…) This is not our aspiration, what we want.” (Interview with staff of the Caucasian 
Institute for Development in Tbilisi, Georgia, October 2010). 
20 Interview conducted with a representative of the Georgian branch of the International Organization for Migration 
in Tbilisi, Georgia, October 2010.
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Georgia’s territorial integrity. Russia thus linked the prospect of visa facilitation to the “greater good” of 
territorial integrity and added salience to the “smaller carrot” of visa facilitation. While the Georgian au-
thorities frequently hinted at their progress on border management, they still continued to lack substantial 
efforts in the areas of document security and their overall migration management until 2008 (European 
Commission 2008b), since the prospect of visa facilitation of the EU was not matched by a concrete man-
date of the European Commission to start negotiations.
The situation changed after the war with Russia in August 2008. Following the cease-fire agreement, the EU 
indeed rewarded Georgia with a negotiation mandate on visa facilitation. The mandate was given explicitly 
as a result of the conflict and aimed at providing equality to Russian and Georgian citizens, as the conclu-
sions of the Extraordinary European Council in 2008 documented (RAPID 2008). The EU clearly linked visa 
facilitation to the signing of the EC readmission agreement and the introduction of biometric passports 
as non-negotiable parts to the prospect of visa facilitation.21 In 2008, Franco Frattini, EU-Commissioner 
for Justice, Freedom and Security called for the introduction of biometric passports in Georgia in 2009 to 
profit from visa facilitation (International Organization for Migration 2008), while the package approach 
of EC readmission and visa facilitation agreements had been institutionalized for a longer time (Trauner/
Kruse 2008b).
Georgia subsequently progressed with regard to document security. The agency charged with its implemen-
tation, the Civil Registry Agency of Georgia, managed to introduce the passports in April 2010 supported 
by a strong financial commitment of the EU under the ENPI umbrella (Civil Registry Agency Georgia 2011; 
Kirtzkhalia 2010). Representatives of the Civil Registry Agency stressed that the introduction of biometric 
passports was due to tough conditionality on the EU side in the visa facilitation process.22 However, the EC 
readmission	negotiations, which were opened at the same time as the visa facilitation negotiations, still 
faced some domestic obstacles given Georgia’s highly liberal migration policy. The EC readmission proposal 
foresaw that all third country nationals had to be readmitted back to Georgia, if their documents showed 
that they had been in Georgia before. As stated by representatives of Georgia and the EU in the negotia-
tions, the proposal raised severe criticism from the Georgian side, as the liberal visa regime of Georgia 
increased the probability of readmitting people that had easily entered the country from other states.23 
The provision could be watered down by the Georgian negotiators so that the final document only listed 
third country nationals that were holding a valid or shortly outdated visa from Georgia to be readmitted 
back.24 The negotiations were successfully finished on 17 June 2010, when the visa facilitation agreement 
was signed (RAPID 2010). Compliance thus remained selective, due to the fact that Georgia indeed man-
aged to introduce biometric passports, but signed a watered-down readmission agreement and has so far 
failed to pass a national action plan on migration.
21 Interview with an official of the EU division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia in Tbilisi, Georgia, October 
2010.
22 Interview with an official of the Civil Registry Agency of the Ministry of Justice of Georgia in Tbilisi, October 
2010.
23 Interview with an official the Office of the State Minister of Euro-Atlantic Integration in Tbilisi, Georgia, October 
2010; Interview with an official of the European Commission, DG Home Affairs, Brussels, Belgium, August 2011.
24 Interview with an official of the Office of the State Minister of Euro-Atlantic Integration in Tbilisi, Georgia, October 
2010.
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Russia, figuring as the provider of an indirect additional conditionality in the visa facilitation process, was 
still used by Georgian authorities as a reference point to lobby for quicker EU integration. The Georgian 
ambassador to the EU strongly blamed the EU visa policy to “endanger Georgia [sic!] peace effort” nam-
ing the EU policy a “terrible and dangerous precedent” (Samadashvili 2007) and called for the immediate 
opening of negotiations on EU-Georgian visa facilitation. The same pattern occurred with regard to visa 
liberalization. The State Minister for Euro-Atlantic integration indirectly accused the EU of trading Georgian 
sovereignty by not granting visa liberalization to Georgia prior to Russia: 
“We are not complaining. But we are warning our friends that it would be very unwise to give Russia 
visa	liberalisation	before	us	-	not	because	we	are	against	it	in	principle,	but	because	of	Russia’s	illegal	
passportisation.	It	would	be	very	damaging	for	EU’s	policies	in	support	of	Georgia’s	territorial	integrity	
and	sovereignty”	(Giorgi Baramidze cited in: Pop 2011).
The negative incentives provided to Georgia with the Russian passportization did thus not only add lever-
age to the conditionality of the EU after the war in 2008. In light of the strong endorsement of the prin-
ciple of territorial integrity by the EU, the negative incentives provided by the Russian passportization also 
equipped Georgia with a means to successfully put pressure on the EU in return. The early provision of the 
incentive of visa facilitation to Georgia was no longer linked to the regatta principle and differentiation be-
tween the neighborhood countries, but to geopolitical concerns. In a nutshell, the confrontation between 
Georgia and Russia helped to provide for additional conditionality to overcome the incompatibility of the 
ENP and the Georgian agenda, while at the same time it could be used by the Georgian authorities to suc-
cessfully pressure the EU for a quicker integration of Georgia.
5. Conclusion
The paper asked the question under which conditions interdependence with Russia (does not) constrain 
processes of EU rule transfer in the Eastern Neighborhood. It argued that the differential impact of interde-
pendence with Russia on compliance with EU migration policies in Georgia and Armenia depends on two 
domestic conditions: the preferential fit of the domestic governmental agenda and the ENP rules, as well 
as the invocation of policy conditionality by external actors. 
In the cases under scrutiny in this paper, the adoption and implementation of ENP rules was facilitated by 
both negative and positive incentive structures provided by Russia and depended on the preferential fit of 
the ENP rule and the domestic government. Armenia used the cooperation with Russia as an additional op-
portunity to implement its migration policy agenda that was compatible with ENP migration prescriptions, 
while at the same time it served the Armenian elite to decrease domestic economic and political pressure 
after the financial crisis in 2009. In Georgia, however, the regulative EU policies were at odds with a highly 
liberal approach of the government. Hence, the Georgian government implemented the EU rules merely 
as a reaction to the negative incentives stemming from Russia’s policies in Georgia’s secessionist repub-
lics, which provided for additional conditionality to the EU demands. Selective compliance with the non-
negotiable migration policies in the visa facilitation process with the EU was thus predominantly pursued 
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in order to thwart the impact of indirect policy conditionality from Russia and pursue the governmental 
agenda on establishing territorial integrity. Most interestingly, the case of Georgia shows that ENC can also 
use their relationship to other external actors in order to put increasing pressure on the EU to accelerate 
integration processes, which proved successful in the case of visa facilitation with the EU.
While these findings do not challenge the overall argument brought forward by the literature on external 
governance, they suggest a change in perspectives: the recipients of rules promoted by the EU are not only 
passively targeted by institutionalized modes of governance from the EU or foreign policy instruments 
applied by Russia; the governments of target countries actively pick and choose between different policy 
options in line with their own agendas. In cases of more than one actor involved, cross-conditionality and 
cross-socialization processes can thus occur. The findings of the paper yet suggest that they do not depend 
on high interdependence or the proclamation of different “spheres of influence” as such, but on the added 
value they have for domestic governments to cater their relevant constituencies. The adoption of a stron-
ger bottom-up perspective on power-based approaches of external governance can thus help to better 
understand why some rules travel under conditions of multiple interdependence, while others do not. 
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